Between 1970 and 2000 there took place a remarkable and dramatic change in attitudes toward the role of the state in economic activity. An ideology favorable to management of the economy gave way to one in which state action was seen as raising more problems than it solved. The role of the market was extended, markets being created by government where they could not evolve spontaneously, and attempts were made to minimize the role of state-organized and state-funded economic activity. Thus nationalized industries were privatized; services provided by the state were outsourced to private contractors; industries were deregulated; taxes were cut; and attempts were made to reduce the level of government spending. This was much more than a simple change in attitudes toward economic policy: it was a radical shift of worldview, involving a transformation of attitudes across a wide range of the political spectrum as well as being associated with profound changes in economic theory. 1 Inequality in the distribution of income was allowed to rise to levels that would have been considered socially divisive a few decades before. This was based on the twin beliefs that high rewards were needed to provide the incentives required to generate high levels of productivity An early draft of this essay was presented at a seminar at the University of Oporto in May 2004. I am grateful to participants there and at the HOPE conference in April 2004 for valuable comments. In particular, I wish to thank David Levy for drawing my attention to the importance of the Volker Fund and the Earhart Foundation, and to Steve Horwitz for directing me to literature that I had previously missed. An anonymous referee also made some very helpful comments.
1. Note that this does not imply anything about the success or otherwise of these changes, not even about whether competition was in fact increased or the level of government expenditure actually reduced. and growth and that, even if the tails of the income distribution were getting bigger, there was enough mobility to stop people from getting stuck in those tails. This change in the climate of opinion was so profound that, unless it is addressed, it is impossible to understand what happened to economics in the second half of the twentieth century.
In this essay, no attempt is made even to outline the causes of this change in the climate of opinion, for to do that would involve venturing well outside economics to consider, for example, the rise to power of political figures such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the way they and their supporters managed to change not only economic but also political life. 2 That is beyond the scope of such a short essay. Instead, it tries to answer some questions about the role of economics in this transformation of attitudes. 3 Even this is complicated, for economic ideas were both influenced by this climate of opinion and at the same time contributed to it. Though there is an element of truth underlying both perspectives, it is an oversimplification to argue either that economists simply responded to this ideological change-as the "hired guns" of neoliberalism-or that the experience of the postwar era showed that older "socialist" ways of thinking were fundamentally flawed.
An important complication in this story is that the rise of free market economics, as the term is being used here, refers to two distinct changes. The first is the rise of groups and organizations that propagate free market ideas in various ways (these groups are very heterogeneous). The second is a shift in the consensus within the mainstream of economics toward free market ideas: many economists who (at least today) would not be considered (by themselves or by others) free market economists hold views that, in the 1950s, would have been associated with a commitment to free markets. These two developments are not the same thing at all. Indeed, there are considerable ideological and methodological differences between, for example, Austrians and mainstream economics. Though the former's reasons may be very different, some Austrians are as critical of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as are those who criticize it for propagating free market ideology. However, although these two developments are distinct, they are two sides of the change in attitudes toward the state that has taken place in the past three decades and need to be considered together.
To provide a focus, the essay starts, in section 1, with some accounts that relate economists' increased interest in markets to experiences during the postwar period. These are accounts of progress, in which economists are learning from the mistakes of their predecessors in designing overambitious and flawed schemes. Socialism and state intervention are fundamentally flawed, and economists have learned what can be done with markets. However, while such approaches may inspire practitioners, they beg many historiographical questions. Section 2 reviews the thesis, proposed by Sonja Amadae (2003) , that the change in economics since 1970 should be seen as the rise of what she calls "rational choice liberalism," an approach to economics radically different from what was found in economics before the 1940s. Rational choice liberalism, which affected social science much more broadly than just economics, had its origins in the Cold War, but eventually served an ideology very different from that out of which it emerged. The essay then approaches the question through the social dimension. Free market ideas did not just develop: deliberate attempts were made to propagate them through a network of organizations. Some of these organizations, and the links between them, are outlined in sections 3 to 5: free market think tanks (private and outside academia) in section 3; universities and international organizations in section 4, and sources of funding that have sustained free market ideas in section 5. Section 6 then returns to the intellectual dimension, exploring how the techniques employed by economists, largely unnoticed, may have biased the conclusions in favor of market solutions and away from ones that involve state intervention. Finally, the connections between these ways of looking at the problem and Amadae's thesis are discussed and conclusions are drawn about how we should be thinking about the two-way relationship between economic ideas and the climate of opinion.
Learning from Past Mistakes
The reason most economists would, no doubt, give for the change in attitudes toward government is that they have learned that the foundations on which support for interventionist policies rested were inadequate. The postwar consensus that prevailed until the 1970s was biased in favor of government intervention because it took account of market failure (caused by public goods, externalities, imperfections of competition, limited information, myopia, and so on) but ignored government failure. 4 Governments were assumed to be concerned to maximize social welfare and to have the information they needed to achieve this. These attitudes were abandoned in all areas of economics in response to both developments in theory and experience of government intervention over the preceding decades. 5 The transition was clearest in macroeconomics. Whereas it has previously been thought that governments could, at least in principle, have some choice over the level of activity at which they ran the economy, Milton Friedman (1968) , in his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1967, argued that any unemployment rate other than the natural rate would be accompanied by accelerating or decelerating inflation, which would eventually become unsustainable. The crucial element in his argument was that workers cared about their real wages, with the result that the level of unemployment should be related to the expected change in the real wage, not the nominal wage. The addition of a mechanism whereby expectations responded to experience of inflation resulted in the theory that inflation would accelerate if unemployment exceeded the natural rate. Governments, therefore, could not have a lasting effect on the unemployment rate and should not try to do so. This provided a theoretical justification for the monetary policy rule that Friedman had been advocating since the late 1940s: that governments should aim for a constant rate of growth of the money supply.
Friedman's style of argument was old-fashioned, out of tune with the trend toward more formal theorizing, but Edmund Phelps (1967) and colleagues (Phelps et al. 1970) showed how similar conclusions could be derived using models in which information was imperfect and agents made mistakes. This added respectability to the conclusions that Friedman had reached using less formal methods. His conclusions and those of Phelps appeared to be vindicated shortly afterward when, in response to the boom brought about by a decade of full-employment policy and high expenditure on the Vietnam War, commodity prices rose dramatically, culminating in the oil crisis of 1973-74. In the ensuing depression, inflation and unemployment rose simultaneously, exactly as Friedman had predicted would happen. Keynesian theory could provide no guidance, and politicians readjusted their priorities away from employment toward inflation. At the same time, econometric models, based on 4. Kelley (1997, chap. 1) considers the rise of this consensus from the perspective of developments, as seen from a free market perspective, after 1970.
5. References are relatively sparse in this section because the material is so well known.
Keynesian principles, focusing on detailed modeling of aggregate demand, broke down in the presence of major supply shocks. Robert Lucas (1976) offered an explanation that further restricted the scope for government intervention. The Lucas critique argued that not only would the private sector seek to anticipate inflation but it would also try to work out and respond to any predictable patterns in the policy regime. This meant that policymakers could no longer base their actions on observed regularities in private-sector behavior: they had to find out the structural parameters if they were to get models that would be invariant to the policy regime. Given that these structural parameters were assumed to be tastes and technology, and the properties these were assumed to exhibit, this implied a role for government intervention that was very restricted. At the same time there was a movement away from supporting government intervention in microeconomics. Regulation was increasingly seen as creating perverse incentives and distorting resource allocation as much as curing such problems. Efficiency was seen as requiring private ownership of assets and the availability of markets that could establish competitive prices for goods and services. This led many governments to privatize industries owned by the state and to remove regulations over industries as varied as airlines and banking. Where regulation had previously been seen as the solution to problems such as externalities and natural monopoly, attempts were now made to create competitive markets. For example, the United States designed a system for trading permits to emit sulfur dioxide that proved more effective than regulation had been in limiting emissions by power stations. In Britain, competition was introduced into the marketing of electricity and gas, despite there being only a single distribution system for each of these commodities. In many countries, auctions have become the standard way to allocate licenses for rights that would previously have been allocated according to the government's judgment about which company would provide the best service. The most visible examples of this were perhaps the auction, in many countries, of parts of the radio spectrum available for thirdgeneration mobile phones, and the creation of markets for a vast range of new financial products. This is the process described by John McMillan (2002) as "reinventing the bazaar."
One key element in the theory behind this was public choice theory, which dates back to the work of James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olsen, and Anthony Downs around 1960. The conventional view of policy has been to see the government as optimizing some social welfare function. The political process determined the values on which government policy had to be based, and the role of economists was to understand the constraints and design interventions, such as regulations, taxes, or government activities, that would achieve those objectives. Public choice theory challenged this by approaching government decision makers, whether politicians, civil servants, or regulators, as motivated by their own ends. This meant that government policy came to be seen not as maximizing social welfare but as driven by the interests of those responsible for implementing it. Government failure was as pervasive as market failure. The very possibility of government regulation would lead to rent seeking-using lobbying and other activities designed to achieve better treatment-diverting resources away from productive activities. This critique of government, which suggested that inefficiency was inherent in any government-run activities, fits well with the earlier critiques of socialism offered by Friedrich Hayek (1935) and others in the 1920s and 1930s. Hayek had argued that it was impossible (not just difficult) for any organization to have the information necessary to engage in efficient central planning. Hayek's critique of socialism and the public choice critique of government were both theoretical, but the experience of running state-owned enterprises and regulating the private sector was held to have provided numerous examples that showed it to be correct. The outstanding example was the communist world, where state control had been taken to extremes. By the 1980s the performance of these economies was being seen as greatly inferior to that of capitalist economies, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes in the early 1990s was widely seen to have vindicated the claim that socialism was fundamentally flawed.
In macroeconomics, too, attempts were made to endogenize government behavior, making the assumption that bureaucrats and politicians were self-interested. There was some work on "political business cycles" in the 1970s. For example, William D. Nordhaus (1975) developed a model of the cycle in which politicians manipulate policy so as to maximize their chances of reelection by myopic voters who take account of performance during politicians' terms of office. After a period of inactivity, there was a resurgence of such work in the late 1980s when, in the context of rational expectations and forward-looking behavior, asymmetric information was used to explain how politicians might be able to manipulate the economy to their advantages. Alongside this was the literature on the time-consistency (or inconsistency) of optimal monetary policy. The interaction of private agents and government anticipating each others' actions might be a suboptimal inflation rate. To achieve a better outcome, government might have to "tie its hands," perhaps by publicly committing itself to a policy target or by delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank. Political business cycle models were never fully accepted, considerable doubts having been expressed about the empirical support for such theories. It has been argued that, when account is taken on other constraints on central bank action, the issue of credibility is of little practical importance. However, between them, these theories have probably contributed to economists' skepticism about successfully using discretionary policy.
The change that has come about is well illustrated by the example of development economics. In the 1950s and 1960s, development economics offered various theories about why certain countries remained poor. These included climate and cultural factors as well as externalities and unequal bargaining power between rich and poor countries. Some economists (e.g., Ragnar Nurkse) argued that it was necessary to industrialize on a broad front so that each industry would benefit from the externalities created by expansion in other sectors. Others (e.g., Albert Hirschman and Gunnar Myrdal) argued for selective industrialization, to create strategic disequilibria, which would induce further development. Still others (e.g., Raul Prebisch) opted for protection and import substitution, to break out of the trap caused by deteriorating terms of trade. On the basis of these theories, development strategies were designed: some countries sought to industrialize behind protective trade barriers; others to develop agricultural exports; others to invest heavily in infrastructure. The results were very mixed. South Korea and other countries on the Pacific Rim succeeded; Brazil and other countries in Latin America failed to make the advances that had been expected. Much of subSaharan Africa stagnated. From the 1970s, in parallel to the changes taking place in other branches of economics, thinking about development changed. At the theoretical level, interest turned away from "grand theories" of development to the application of standard microeconomics, based on utility and profit maximization, to development problems, on the assumption that behavior was determined in just the same way as in developed countries. Thus peasant farmers' unwillingness to invest in fertilizer despite high expected returns was seen not as nonmaximizing behavior but as a rational response to the riskiness of such methods in comparison with traditional farming methods. At the same time there was a move, prompted both by the failure of many development strategies and by the financial problems faced by many developing countries when energy prices and interest rates both rose in the early 1980s, toward policies that emphasized fiscal discipline and market liberalization.
A decade later John Williamson (1990) could label a list of such ideas the "Washington Consensus." Implementing such reforms provided the "minimum conditions" for developing countries to make progress (Williamson 1990) . This perspective reflected developments in public choice theory in the preceding two decades, according to which government officials were assumed to pursue their own ends rather than disinterestedly to implement policies that would promote social welfare. Thus policy was seen as achieving the "breakthrough, from a dirigiste, statist, 'mercantilist,' closed economy rendered unstable by populist macroeconomic policies, to an open, relatively stable economy using competitive markets to allocate resources" (Williamson 1994, 12) . Stability and prosperity were associated with open economies and competitive markets and instability with closed economies and extensive government intervention. Williamson argued explicitly that experience, notably in East Asia, had shown that the traditional view that development required sets of policies different from the market-oriented policies that had characterized developed economies was wrong. What makes this view significant is that Williamson felt able to claim that the Washington Consensus embodied "the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists" (18). It was not, unlike in the 1950s, the view of a conservative minority. Furthermore, many economists would no doubt endorse the view that "the process of conversion from one [dirigiste] consensus to another [market oriented] in large areas of the world owed . . . [much] to the accumulating evidence of success of neoclassical policies, in particular in East Asia, contrasting with the dismal results of previous policies in so many other countries" (Polak 1997, 217) .
A book that sums up this change is by William Easterly (2002) , subtitled Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. He provides a catalog of "panaceas that failed": using foreign aid to raise investment in developing countries; raising the level of education; giving away contraceptives to reduce unwanted births; lending to poor countries that had not learned to control inflation. In all of these cases, policies were based on then fashionable ideas about what was necessary to promote development. In contrast, the successes of development are centered on the idea that "people respond to incentives." 6 He summarizes the basic principle of economics in two ways: "People do what they get paid to do; what they don't get paid to do, they don't do"; and, "People respond to incentives; all the rest is commentary" (2002, xii) . This translates into development economics as, "If we do the hard work of ensuring that the trinity of First World aid donors, Third World governments, and ordinary Third World citizens have the right incentives, development will happen. If they don't, it won't." The failures of development economics, Easterly argues, arose from policies that violated these basic economic principles.
These examples illustrate the depth of the change that has taken place within economics. Part of the story has been a resurgence of conservative economics. Interest in Hayekian ideas is particularly strong in some of the transition economies of Eastern Europe. Within the mainstream of economics, clear examples are Friedman 1980 or Barro 2002 . However, alongside this renaissance of conservative economics has been a much broader shift in the climate of opinion, of which Williamson, Easterly, and McMillan provide good examples precisely because they do not fall into the conservative category. Williamson (1994, 18) , for example, states explicitly that he defined the Washington Consensus sufficiently broadly to exclude many issues (such as the size of government, the extent of income redistribution, and the type of market economy to be sought) on which there was little agreement (and on many of which his views were the opposite of those held by neoconservatives). Similarly, Easterly (2002, 143) argues that for development to occur, government must provide health, education, and infrastructure services. He even admits that "the new incentive-based views of growth could turn out to be as badly misguided as the panaceas that failed" (143-44). Even more strongly, McMillan (2002, 226) concludes by pointing out that markets work only if they are well designed, that there are limits to what markets can achieve, and that "a modern economy simply cannot run on libertarian principles." All of these economists, from Friedman to McMillan, see economics as having learned from mistakes made in earlier periods. However, though economists might claim that no further explanation is needed-that new theories were adopted because they were better than the old ones-few historians would be happy to stop at such an explanation and alternative versions of the story need to be considered.
The Ideology of Rational Choice
The most developed account of the transformation of economics during this period has been provided by Sonja Amadae (2003) as part of an account of the transformation of social science more generally. Her story starts with the sense of defeat among Western intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s, and the perceived need to develop a philosophy of markets and democracy that would provide an alternative to Marxism. That philosophy was rational choice liberalism, the philosophy that became "the linchpin of the triumphant West's ideological victory over Soviet communism" (Amadae 2003, 4) . It had three broad elements: the selfinterested rational actor, set-theoretic and axiomatic treatment of human rationality, and a commitment to universal and objective scientific law (3). Rational choice theory extended beyond any one social science, or even the social sciences as a whole.
The key figure in Amadae's account is Kenneth Arrow, whose research "served to establish the disciplinary standard within economics" through his contributions to the fields of social choice, general equilibrium theory, decision theory, and the economics of information (Amadae 2003, 85) , as well as informing U.S. government policy. The work that formed the basis for this influence, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) arose directly from Arrow's role as a "defense intellectual whose career as a key contributor to the neoclassical synthesis in economics is inseparable from his Cold War policy role" (Amadae 2003, 85) . In 1948, as an intern at RAND, he was given the task of determining a utility function for the Soviet Union that could be used in game theoretic analysis of nuclear strategy. This led to Social Choice and Individual Values, the first version of which appeared as a RAND report. Arrow's use of set theory rather than calculus severed the link between rational choice theory and utility theory, for rationality became defined in terms of transitivity, not in terms of preference fields (Amadae 2003, 108) . It therefore became a tool that could be applied to social science in general, not simply to questions of consumer choice.
In the decades before Arrow's work, there had been intensive debate over the merits of socialism versus capitalism. Arrow's theorem provided a solution to that debate by showing that, if one held certain values, the notion of collective decisions that represented individual choices did not make sense. Given that socialism was about collective decision making, this provided a political philosophy that "triumphed over Marxism, Kantian moral philosophy, Rousseau's political theory, and classical utilitarianism . . . both providing a basis for American political and economic liberalism while simultaneously undermining the alternative social philosophies of communism, idealist democracy, and totalitarianism" (87). This book was based on four assumptions: "that science is objective; that it yields universal laws; that reason is not culturally relative; and that individuals' preferences are both inviolable and incomparable" (84). These four assumptions "provide both the structure for his [Arrow's] impossibility theorem and the basis of the mainstream Cold War consensus on social philosophy characterizing rational choice liberalism" (129).
Amadae argues that the effect of Arrow's book was to establish social choice theory as an alternative to welfare economics and that social welfare was completely undermined. Though social choice theorists worked on extending Arrow's result, trying to find ways round his impossibility theorem, she argues that this served to reinforce the underlying ideals on which it was based. 7 The other main effect was to underpin public choice theory as it emerged in the 1960s, most of which is based on the premise of individualism. Arrow himself claimed that his theorem indicted the market as much as democratic voting and that he had the same faith in the market as in social planning, but others have seen the case differently. Amadae (2003, 128) quotes Charles Rowley as an example: "Arrow's theorem provides incontrovertible support for market process and encouragement for those who seek to constrain the range of collective choice to the limited functions of the minimal state." As public choice theory spread through economics in the 1970s, this view of Arrow's theorem no doubt gained greater currency.
This view that rational choice theory marks a radical break with previous approaches to social science and that, though originating in the Cold War technocratic ideology, it later provided the foundation on which free market economics could be based is discussed further in the final section. Before that, however, other aspects of the story need to be considered.
Think Tanks
The shift toward market solutions did not occur spontaneously; it was actively promoted by groups of economists committed to opposing 7. See also Amadae 2003 , chap. 8, "Consolidating Rational Choice Liberalism, 1970 -2000 socialism, making the case for free enterprise, and reviving the fortunes of liberalism. In the first stage, the most influential institution was, as the previous section has made clear, the RAND Corporation, which brought together the Cowles Commission, Princeton University, and many of the economists associated with the development of rational choice theory. 8 RAND was a think tank set up by the U.S. Air Force at Santa Monica, California, to prevent the scientific and technical expertise that it had brought together during the Second World War from being dispersed. It was established in 1946 as a division of the Douglas Aircraft Company to undertake research on air warfare. In 1948, by which time its staff had grown to 255, it separated from Douglas to avoid conflicts of interest and was established as a nonprofit organization, with H. Rowan Gaither Jr. as chairman of the board of trustees.
Gaither was involved with the Ford Foundation (from 1951 by far the largest American philanthropy) and was involved in writing the foundation's statement of aims. Faced with the choice between democracy and totalitarianism, it was essential to get objective impartial advice from a professional corps of experts: "To replace partisan controversy with objective fact" (Amadae 2003, 36) . Philanthropies such as Ford "ha [d] no stockholders and no constituents . . . [and] represent[ed] no private, political or religious interests" and so were ideally placed to supply this. Once it had become a nonprofit organization, this description fitted RAND perfectly, and it began to receive considerable funding from the Ford Foundation as well as the Air Force. In 1953, Gaither became president of the Ford Foundation, despite the potential conflict of interest with his position at RAND. This marked a shift to the right at RAND, away from Eisenhower's more moderate Republicanism toward a more aggressive conservatism. According to Amadae (2003, 38) :
Hoffman [the previous Ford Foundation president] . . . was unequivocally opposed to using foundation resources in efforts to destabilize foreign political regimes. Gaither and his close associates . . . on the other hand, supported foundation efforts to further political and psychological warfare. Similarly, Gaither's support of the social and behavioral sciences as a tool for an expertly managed society contrasted with Hoffman's interdialogic, democratic cosmopolitanism. Under Gaither's tutelage, the Ford Foundation promoted research oriented toward national security.
Gaither served as a bridge between Ford and RAND. Under him, RAND, increasingly dominated by economists, produced "systems analysis," in which the principles of rational action provided the central organizing framework.
Though RAND played a crucial role in the development of the theory and arguably the ideology of the market economy, it was by no stretch of the imagination something that could be called a "free market" think tank. Though freedom was an important part of its ideology, its commitment to technocratic management and its location in relation to the U.S. Air Force placed it in opposition to much free market ideology. The rise of institutions aimed at promoting free markets and more systematically opposing government intervention came from institutions that lay outside government.
The best starting point for the rise of organizations aimed specifically at arguing the case for free markets is the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), the first meeting of which took place in Switzerland, in April 1947. 9 Following on from an earlier meeting, "Le Colloque Walter Lippmann," held in France in 1938, Friedrich Hayek sought to bring together a group of intellectuals who could develop "a philosophy of freedom." The background was widespread pessimism about the future of capitalism and, with it, of free societies. John Maynard Keynes, Arnold Toynbee, Bertrand Russell, Oswald Spengler, T. S. Eliot, and Joseph Schumpeter had all argued that capitalism was doomed, with many of them predicting the inevitable coming of socialism. Hayek saw the task of the new organization not as trying to exert an immediate influence on policy but as having a long-term influence on the climate of opinion, comparing its task explicitly with that facing the earlier generation of socialist and new liberal intellectuals who had formed the Fabian Society.
Though Hayek wanted to include more historians and philosophers, the nature of his contacts meant that the thirty-nine people at the initial gathering (and hence the society that was formed in November 1947) contained a high proportion of economists: 10 However, of all these, Hayek was unquestionably the dominant figure, not just because he had been instrumental in forming the MPS but because of The Road to Serfdom (1944) . As Keynes symbolized the philosophy against which they were fighting (see Cockett 1994 , chap. 1), Hayek's book provided the manifesto of the new movement. 11 In Britain, The Road to Serfdom, in the words of one commentator, "succeeded in redefining the political debate . . . in a way that no single book or statement of belief has done since" (Cockett 1994, 97) . In the United States, after Hayek had failed to find a publisher, Director and Knight had the book published by the University of Chicago Press.
The significance of the MPS is not that it played a major role in sponsoring either free market research or activities related to economic policy: it did neither of these. Instead, its importance lies in its being the center of a network. It linked several of the main institutions involved in the subsequent transformation of economics: the network of think tanks centered in the London Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Chicago school, and later the network centered on the public choice society. Other organizations, such as the Institute for Humane Studies (discussed below), performed a similar networking role, but the MPS was unique in the range of its contacts (including libertarians, Austrians, and mainstream economists) and in the period over which it operated.
While Hayek was preparing for the initial meeting of the MPS, he was approached by a businessman, Anthony Fisher, who had recently read The Road to Serfdom and wanted advice about influencing public policy for the better. Hayek's response was, "I would join with others in forming a scholarly research organisation to supply intellectuals in universities, schools, journalism and broadcasting with authoritative studies of the economic theory of markets and its application to practical affairs" (quoted in Cockett 1994, 124) . This eventually materialized, in 1955, as the IEA. This had a different focus from the MPS in that it was concerned with what Hayek had called the "second-hand dealers" in ideas (123). The IEA was, as a registered charity, strictly nonpolitical, its 10. Hartwell 1995, 45-46 , contains a complete list. The sixty-four founding members are listed on page 51.
11. The other book usually grouped with this is Popper 1952. Karl Popper, a colleague of Hayek's at the London School of Economics, also attended the initial meeting of the MPS. aims referring not to free markets (which might have sounded political) but to "the study of markets and pricing systems as technical devices for registering preferences and apportioning resources" (132). However, it published a series of pamphlets and books, by academic economists as well as by journalists and political figures, exploring market solutions to economic problems, advancing many ideas (such as privatization, deregulation, and methods for creating markets) that eventually became government policy. Despite its nonpartisan position, it exerted a particularly strong influence on the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher. Beyond this, it arguably helped change the climate of opinion through advocating policies that had previously not been taken seriously (the "thinking the unthinkable" of Cockett's title) and through providing a stream of material that, in addition to being accessible to policymakers, was attractive to students as applications of microeconomic theory.
In setting up the IEA, Fisher was influenced by the Foundation for Economic Education in New York, which he visited in 1952. This was founded in 1946 by Leonard E. Read, supported by Mises and the journalist Henry Hazlitt (both at the initial MPS meeting), to "educate the world on the principles of free-market economics": "individual freedom," "private property," "limited government," and "free trade." 12 Like the IEA, it focused on retailing free market ideas, not on academic research. The same was true of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), founded in 1943. Education in the principles of liberty was also the aim of the Liberty Fund, established in 1960 by Pierre F. Goodrich. Goodrich was closely involved with the MPS from 1951 till his death in 1973, when he left most of his estate to the Liberty Fund, which used it to finance an extensive program of conferences and publications (see Starbuck 2001) .
The IEA, AEI, and FEE were not the first think tanks to be formed in Britain or the United States to analyze social policy. 13 In Britain, there was the Fabian Society (established in 1884), the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (1931) , and Political and Economic Planning (1931) . In the United States, there were the Russell Sage Foundation (1907 ), the Brookings Institution (1916 , and the National Bureau 12. Taken from its Web site (www.fee.org, "About FEE"), which describes it as "America's oldest free-market organization. of Economic Research (1920) . These, however, though rarely neutral in that their work had identifiable influence on policy (cf. Abelson 2002, 23) , were based on the premise that disinterested social scientific inquiry could contribute to better policymaking and were engaged in academic research, the policy implications of which might emerge only in the long term. They have been described as "universities without students" (McGann and Weaver 2002, 7; Abelson 2002, 18-19) . Even the Fabians, though politically committed, were convinced that the optimal strategy was a long-term one. These organizations differed from those established in what has been called the second wave of think tank creation, from 1946 to 1970, dominated by contract research. The major one (discussed in more detail in section 3) was RAND, founded in 1948 to undertake research that would aid U.S. defense policy. The Hudson Institute (established 1961) was modeled on RAND. Toward the end of this period the Urban Institute was established (in 1968) to focus on domestic problems.
In the 1970s there was a further change in the think tank landscape with the sudden proliferation of advocacy think tanks, closer to the IEA, AEI, and FEE in that they were committed to advocating certain causes and marketing their ideas in a way not true of previous generations of academic and contract-research think tanks. Many of these were committed to free markets: in that sense, unlike the earlier academic think tanks, they were not searching for new policies so much as applying policies they already accepted (cf. Denham and Garnett 1998) . In Britain there emerged the Centre for Policy Studies (1974) , the Adam Smith Institute (1977) , and the Social Affairs Unit (1980), the last one set up with the active support of the IEA. In this period, Fisher was also instrumental in setting up the Canadian Fraser Institute (1975) and the International Center for Economic Policy Studies (1977) , which later became the Manhattan Institute (see Frost 2002, chap. 8; Abelson 2002, 44-46) . 14 Encouraged by these, Fisher embarked on a program to create institutes across the world through Atlas (founded in 1981): "A non-profit 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia, that brings freedom to the world by helping develop and strengthen a network of market-oriented think tanks that spans the globe," its mission being "to discover, develop and support intellectual entrepreneurs worldwide who have the potential to create independent public policy institutes and related programs, which advance our vision; and to provide ongoing 14. Frost discusses ways in which the Manhattan Institute differed from the IEA. support as such institutes and programs mature." 15 At a dinner to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the IEA, Fisher referred to "a family of 40 institutes in 20 countries" (Frost 2002, 161) . 16 By the end of the century, Atlas was working with or supporting 150 such bodies (Frost 2002, 157) . 17 The most important development in the United States was the Heritage Foundation, established in 1973. Despite the existence of the AEI, it was felt that there was a need for a more aggressive conservative body to influence policy to counter the efficiency with which liberal (Left) ideas were translated into policy via the Brookings Institution, seen as part of the Left's "finely-tuned policy making machine" (Edwards 1997, 2-3) . This feeling became more acute after the failure of Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign, when many conservatives felt that even Republicans were pursuing centrist policies and were not doing enough to stand up to communism. 18 It was against this background that a group centered on Strom Thurmond and two other Republican senators, backed by Joseph Coors, set up the Analysis and Research Association (ARA) in 1971. 19 The aim was to provide members of Congress with more timely economic advice than the AEI was providing. For a variety of reasons this developed, in 1972, into the Schuchman Foundation, which also attracted funds from Richard M. Scaife and other businessmen. Because of differences on how it should operate, it was decided to form a new organization that would aim to feed directly into the policymaking process. This was given the name of the Heritage Foundation, founded in 1973. As late as 1977, when Edwin Feulner took over as its president, it was not clear that the foundation would survive (Edwards 1997, 24) .
Over the following years, however, Feulner sought to use it to create "a new conservative coalition that would replace the New Deal coalition which had dominated American politics for half a century," focusing on educational choice, urban enterprise zones, supply-side economics, deregulation, and reductions in the size of government (32). 20 In 1979, 15. Quotations from www.atlasusa.org/aboutatlas/index.php?refer=aboutatlas. 16. For a directory of many such organizations, see the appendix to Frost 2002, 179-261. 17 . For broader international surveys of think tanks, see Stone, Denham, and Garnett 1998 and McGann and Weaver 2002 . 18. Feulner (2002 claims that some, at this time, were predicting worldwide state socialism and the end of U.S. global power.
19. This account of the origins of the Heritage Foundation is based on Edwards 1997 , chap. 1. 20. Edwards (1997 2) also provides an account of the Heritage Foundation's ideas on foreign policy. See Feulner 2002 for a shorter account.
when Jimmy Carter seemed likely to be defeated, the Heritage Foundation took on the task of designing a conservative program along these lines that an incoming Republican administration could take up-Mandate for Leadership, which sold fifteen thousand copies in the first year after publication. When Ronald Reagan was elected, this book, and with it the foundation, became securely established in the policymaking process (47-52). Feulner claims that its income grew at 300 percent annually from 1973 to 1980, at 14 percent annually from 1980 to 1990, and at 10 percent from 1990 to 1997. By 1997 its annual income was $35 million and its operating expenses $26.6 million, larger than even the much longer-established Brookings and Hoover Institutions. 21 A much larger proportion (61 percent) came from individuals than was the case with other large think tanks.
Universities and International Organizations
Within academia, the main center for research along free market lines was undertaken during the 1950s and 1960s at the University of Chicago. The core of the Chicago school was a group of Knight's students and protégés that formed in the mid-1930s: Milton and Rose Friedman, George Stigler, Allen Wallis, Aaron Director, and Henry Simons. 22 However, up to the 1940s, Chicago economics was very diverse, the turning point coming in 1945-46, when Oskar Lange and Jacob Viner left, and Friedman, Director, and Wallis joined the faculty (Stigler did not arrive till 1958). On his arrival, Friedman immediately assumed the intellectual leadership of the group, setting the tone of Chicago economics for the next quarter century. There was opposition to his ideas but this was greatly reduced with the departure of the Cowles Commission to Yale in 1953. Melvin W. Reder (1982, 32) 
sums up Friedman's influence as follows:
This exposure to the force of Friedman's argument became a distinguishing characteristic of Chicago economists, faculty members and students. However much they might disagree with him on one or a number of issues, awareness of the strength of Friedman's case led Chicago economists to become interpreters of Friedman's views to uncomprehending outsiders. . . . 22. See Reder 1982, 7-11. early 1960s, of making all Chicago economists appear to be dominated by Friedman and, I suspect, had the further effect of bringing them much closer to his own views than they would otherwise have come.
The core of the Chicago school was its PhD program, within which Economics 301 (taught mostly by Friedman and Gary Becker) played a key role. This was a rigorous training program, with a high failure rate, that created economists with the Chicago style of thought (Reder 1982, 8-9) . The primary commitment was to "good economics," where good economics meant the rigorous application of standard microeconomic theory. Over the years, this theory was applied to an increasing range of applied fields, enlarging the influence of the Chicago school. It was entirely possible to accept this way of doing economics even though one did not start from Friedman's or Stigler's ideological position. Faculty appointments were based, as in other universities, on "professional recognition." Thus in 1974, Friedman could note that eleven out of thirteen Clark Medal winners had either held or been offered a teaching position at Chicago. However, in applied fields, the emphasis was not on technical virtuosity but on "the interest and reliability of [an applicant's] empirical findings" (Reder 1982, 33) : "In these (numerous) cases, adherence to TP becomes very important. Inconsistency of empirical findings with the implications of TP, especially if the investigator is not greatly concerned about the inconsistency, is considered to be poor performance." TP is short for tight prior equilibrium theory, defined by Reder (1982, 11) as "rooted in the hypothesis that decision makers so allocate the resources under their control that there is no alternative allocation such that any one decision maker could have his utility increased without a reduction occurring in the expected utility of at least one other decision maker." In other words, good empirical work supported the conclusion that the world was Pareto efficient. The implications of this for attitudes toward the state are clear.
A related interpretation argues that the distinguishing feature of Chicago economics was "a disciplinary self-critique" that "narrowed the boundaries of 'legitimate' economics in the attempt to entrench it in its area of scientific competence" (Emmett 1998, 135) . 23 Starting in the 1940s, there was a shift away from examining what students had learned 23. There is a clear parallel here with Friedman's (1953) dramatic narrowing of the scope of economic theory to exclude the processes whereby business decisions were made. about a field to whether they could apply price theory. This was institutionalized through the system of workshops, started by Gregg Lewis and formally integrated into the PhD program in 1952-53 (147). Though they covered a wide range of fields, the most prominent was Friedman's workshop on money and banking. These workshops helped define what was meant by "good economics" and to instill its methods into graduate students.
What came to be known as Chicago school was never synonymous with the economics department: there were members of the department who did not support Friedman's approach, and there were people outside it (e.g., Wallis, in the business school) who did. Though sympathetic with some of Friedman's views, Knight and Hayek did not agree with his way of doing economics and remained outside. Becker was appointed to the sociology department in 1983, alongside James Coleman, who was applying rational choice methods to sociology. Henry Simons, Aaron Director, and Ronald Coase had positions in the law school. As the list of Nobel laureates indicates, 24 by the 1980s Chicago economics had become a major influence on the profession and on other disciplines, notably sociology and law (Medema 1998) . Outside the United States, Chicago economists saw themselves as exporting "good economics." Harry Johnson, a Chicago professor from 1959 to 1974, was simultaneously (1966-74) a professor at the London School of Economics (LSE). His main aim was to promote good economics, though critics such as Joan Robinson saw him as trying to turn LSE into a version of Chicago. The most substantial foreign link, however, came through an agreement, lasting from 1955 to 1964, with the Catholic University of Chile (Harberger 1997; Valdes 1995) . On the basis of this experience, the program was extended to other countries in Latin America: Argentina and Colombia. Harberger (1997, 302) estimated that from 1955 to 1980, "more than half of the economists trained at leading foreign institutions studied at Chicago." Chicago-trained economists were responsible for many of the liberalization and reform programs pursued.
After Chicago, the second major network in the transformation of attitudes toward government was the one centered on Public Choice Society. 25 Modern public choice stems from a group of works published around 1960. Its institutional origins lie in the Thomas Jefferson Center 24. Friedman, in 1976; Schultz, 1979; Stigler, 1982; Miller, 1990; Coase, 1991; Becker, 1992; Fogel, 1993; Lucas, 1995; Heckman, 2000. 25. This draws heavily on Medema 1998. See also Mitchell 1988 Mitchell , 1999 for Studies in Political Economy at the University of Virginia, by Buchanan and Warren Nutter, in 1957. This center brought together scholars "who wish to preserve a social order based on liberty" (quoted in Medema 2000, 303) . They were trained as Chicago economists and, though convinced that liberty could best be sustained through free markets, they realized that there was a need to study how price theory could be applied to political economy-to problems of decision making that did not take place through markets-and the center began to focus on this through establishing, in 1963, In 1963 the Thomas Jefferson Center held a conference on nonmarket decision making. By 1970 this had become an annual event, and sessions began to be held at the American Economic Association meetings. After the 1967 conference, the Public Choice Society was set up, and by 1971 it had five hundred members. Those attending the conferences and joining the society were a mixture of economists and political scientists, and they became a forum linking a wide range of people, most of whom shared with Buchanan and Tullock the rational choice approach. By the end of the 1990s, a sizable number of papers presented at meetings of the Public Choice Society were being published in mainstream journals such as the American Economic Review.
The group, or perhaps a collection of groups, most ardently in favor of free markets was the "Austrians." 26 These were economists, mostly in the United States, who sought to keep alive the traditions of Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. However, though Hayek's ideas on the market later proved an important influence on Austrian economics, in the 1950s it was Mises who kept a specifically Austrian tradition going at New York University, where he joined the faculty in 1946 and continued to teach until his death in 1973. His students there included Murray Rothbard and Israel Kirzner. When Austrian economics began to grow in the mid-1970s, these two were, along with Ludwig Lachman, from South Africa, the dominant figures. Starting with a conference in 1974, they began to organize as a distinct group centered on a small number of universities: New York, George Mason, and Auburn. New York University established an Austrian Economics Program (with substantial support from the Sarah Scaife Foundation) and George Mason launched the Center for the Study of Market Processes (supported by several foundations, the largest supporter being the Koch Family Foundations).
The final type of institution that needs to be mentioned is international organizations, of which the most important are the IMF and the World Bank. 27 These were not connected with the rise of free market groups (indeed, most Austrians have been hostile to such large governmental organizations) but are an important part of the shift in opinion within mainstream economics. The IMF was dominated by economists, and its heart was considered to be its research department. 28 The IMF was important in the 1950s and 1960s in two ways. It contributed to the literature on international monetary economics, and it helped the international dissemination of economic ideas. It ran training courses for officials from member countries, undertook consultation visits, and entered into negotiations over standby credit arrangements. The result, according to Jacques Polak (1997, 217) , was "in many cases to bring about a certain parallelism in economic thinking that greatly facilitated agreement on the conditions governing the extension of Fund credit when the need for a Fund arrangement presented itself." These channels of communication were among the factors that led to the emergence of the Washington Consensus in the late 1980s.
In the early decades of the IMF, lending was primarily to developed economies that were experiencing temporary balance of payments difficulties. The period was also one of comparative stability (the "Golden Age") with the result that payments deficits were generally on a limited scale. However, in the 1970s, when the world economy became more unstable, it was faced with much larger deficits and with much larger disparities between inflation rates than had been possible under the Bretton Woods system. The IMF therefore had to become involved in lending on a larger scale, recycling dollars accumulated by oil-exporting countries and helping oil importers fund much larger payments deficits than had been observed earlier. After the 1979 oil shock, to which many developed countries responded with more restrictive policies than had 27. This claim refers to the 1970s transformation. If the focus were on earlier periods, other organizations, such as the League of Nations (which commissioned influential studies in the 1930s) and the United Nations (important in postwar development economics) would have to be given more weight.
28. See Polak 1997. been imposed after the 1973-74 shock, balance of payments and international debt problems arose on an even larger scale, this time encompassing many developing economies. The IMF responded to this need by greatly increasing countries' borrowing facilities. In 1983, quotas were twice as high in relation to trade as in 1972. The result was that the IMF began to impose stricter conditions on lending to ensure that the necessary adjustments took place. According to Polak (1984, 254) , "There can . . . be no doubt that since 1981 the Fund's conditionality has been more demanding than it was in any earlier period." As the IMF became involved not simply in providing short-term funds itself but in negotiating credit packages-serving as an intermediary between countries that were in difficulties and commercial banks, aid donors, the World Bank, and other organizations-its role in imposing conditions on recipient countries grew. Furthermore, as it became more involved with developing countries, the conditions perceived as necessary to ensure financial viability became even more controversial than those imposed on developed countries and went beyond financial matters to include trade liberalization and other reforms. In contrast to the IMF, economists played a minor role in the early years of the World Bank, there being only 20 on the staff as late as 1965. 29 Under Robert McNamara, the number of economists grew to 120 by 1969. One reason for this expansion was McNamara's belief that because loans would inevitably be small in relation to a country's total investment, it was important to disseminate ideas. The result was that greater importance was attached to research; over the next two decades, the number of economists employed at the World Bank rose to around 800. Many of them were undertaking academic research of a type that would not have been out of place in a university.
The World Bank's role changed in 1980 when it abandoned its previous practice of lending only to finance specific projects and introduced "structural-adjustment lending." The aim of this lending was to help countries overcome medium-term balance of payments policies without the adverse effect on growth that would be produced by traditional expenditure-reducing policies. Loans were made on condition that countries implemented reform programs, liberalizing their economies. Financial markets were to be opened up; the public sector was to be reduced; markets were to be deregulated; and controls on investment were to be 29. See Ferreira and Stern 1997 and De Vries 1997. removed. Given the serious balance of payments problems faced by many developing countries during and after the 1980s debt crisis, such policies became a major political issue, as many criticized the World Bank and the IMF for being the main instruments of conservative policies to force governments to liberalize their economies at the expense of the poor.
Funding Free Markets
An important element in the story told in the previous three sections is funding. The institutions discussed in the preceding sections arose because there were people who wanted to pay for them. The picture of funding is complex and not enough is known to be able to describe it in any detail. However, it is important to make the point that funding may have played a role, if only for two reasons. The first is to make it clear that the preferences of potential funding sources can and do influence what is done: money does not flow automatically on the basis of some notion of quality independent of ideology or interests. The second is to point out the complexity of the picture.
When U.S. philanthropic foundations began, in the interwar period, to get involved in funding economic research by other organizations, one of their aims was to distance themselves from controversy that arose from employing researchers themselves (see Goodwin 1998, 74-78) . The main foundations funding economics were Carnegie, Rockefeller, Sloan, and Russell Sage, along with many overseas organizations. From the 1950s these were joined by the Ford Foundation, which became able to fund research on a large scale once it had settled a dispute with the U.S. Treasury. In 1951 it was by far the largest foundation, with assets of $417 million, making it significantly larger than either Rockefeller's $122 million or Carnegie's $170 million. The aim of these bodies was to influence economists' behavior, through funding economists they thought were good and not funding those they thought were bad, 30 but overall their goals were generally to promote impartial, objective research, and bodies such as Brookings, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Social Science Research Council fitted the bill. Though not ideologically neutral, they had no overt political agenda. This was part of their ideology-that good social science research would promote the private 30. Craufurd Goodwin (1998, 76-77) provides some examples of such attempts to exert influence. enterprise system and improve economic performance. It has been described as "scientific philanthropy" (cf. Parmar 2002, 15-16) .
In the 1950s this policy continued, though it began to change. Ford put money into RAND, which, as explained above, took this ideology of scientific detachment even further. The association with the Cold War, the U.S. defense establishment, and anticommunism arguably involved a strengthening and focusing of an ideology already present. Ford's involvement with Chicago, like that of Carnegie and Rockefeller, was part of a much broader strategy of consolidating U.S. influence in Europe and the rest of the world by fostering pro-U.S. modernizing elites (Parmar 2002, 14) . Henry Ford II caused the Ford Foundation's policy to swing to the right (Amadae 2003, 38) . However, a technocratic vision of government, represented by the policies pursued by Robert McNamara (who came from the Ford Motor Company) in the 1960s as secretary of defense, could still involve what might be regarded as "big" government and "efficient" involvement of government in economic activities. The free world needed government as well as private enterprise.
Up to the 1960s, there were only two significant foundations committed to explicitly free market ideas: the Volker Fund and the Earhart Foundation. The Volker Fund supported the Foundation for Economic Education, the American participants in early meetings of the MPS, and many publications including the Volker Fund Series in Humane Studies and texts given away through the National Book Foundation. It helped bring Hayek to Chicago and supported Mises in New York, as well as other individuals such as Rothbard, who from 1952 to 1962 was paid for reviewing books for their suitability for distribution through the National Book Foundation. The Volker Fund's work was continued through the Institute of Humane Studies, set up in 1961 by F. A. Harper (who had been on the staff of FEE from 1946 to 1958) and which continued its educational programs. 31 The Fund was dissolved in 1962, a large part of its funds eventually going to the Hoover Institution. 32 The Earhart Foundation was, in its early years, important through its one-year fellowships. By 1957 these had gone to seventy-five graduate students in economics. Nine out of thirty-five Nobel Prize winners had previously received 31. A referee has suggested I should pay more attention to the many summer schools for undergraduate and postgraduate students that have taken place, which also helped create networks and encourage certain types of thinking. Assessing this is a major task, so here I can do no more than indicate that it may have been an important factor.
32. This draws on a number of sources including Kelley 1997, 62; George 1996. an Earhart fellowship, including Becker, Buchanan, Coase, Friedman, Hayek, Lucas, Daniel McFadden, Vernon Smith, and George Stigler. Many of the initiatives discussed above were the result of wealthy individuals deciding to commit money to promote the case of free enterprise. Hunold, who played a major role in the early years of the MPS, was a Swiss businessman. Fisher, who was behind the IEA, was the owner of Buxted Chickens, which was responsible for the successful introduction of broiler chickens into the U.K. (and was advised by an agriculture specialist he met through the MPS). Joseph Coors, of Coors brewery, was behind the Heritage Foundation. Also important was Richard Mellon Scaife, the chairman of the Scaife Foundations in 1973, pursuing a consistently conservative line, who became a trustee of the Heritage Foundation in 1985. Coors and Scaife initially put in $250,000 and $900,000, respectively. 33 Between 1985 and 2002 the Scaife Foundations contributed around $20 million to Heritage. 34 Between the same years, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation contributed over $12 million, the John M. Olin Foundation over $8 million, and the Castle Rock Foundation (founded with an endowment from the Adolph Coors Foundation) almost $2 million, as total grants from foundations over this period came to $45 million. However, from 1978 to 1997, such income accounted for around only a quarter of Heritage's income, between 40 and 50 percent of which came from individuals (Feulner 2002, 72) . In the 1980s corporations provided almost as much as foundations. 35 This financing is typical of the practice of a group of conservative foundations to focus resources on a select group of think tanks and other institutions. During the same period, the American Enterprise Institute received $32 million from a similar list of foundations. A similar pattern can be found in foundation support for universities. Certain institutions have been targeted and receive consistent funding over a period of years, enabling them to develop. Given their importance to developments in economics during this period, good examples are the Center for the Study of Public Choice at George Mason University and Law and 33. This and the immediately following statistics come from www.mediatransparency.org. Note that data from some of the smaller foundations are incomplete, so this may slightly underestimate the total.
34. The Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Scaife Family Foundation, and the Carthage Foundation.
35. Data for the period since 1985 can be obtained from www.mediatransparency.org. Because of disclosure regulations, data on philanthropic foundations is more complete than for individuals or corporations.
Economics at Chicago. 36 For the former, the largest donor was the Scaife Foundations, followed by the Olin and Bradley foundations. Scaife and Olin illustrate the way funding has been provided consistently, much of it to cover general operating expenses rather than specific projects. Compared with the center's overall budget, the sums received have not been large, but they are significant and regular enough to have been very important. A similar pattern emerges for Chicago's Law and Economics, though the sums involved are larger, and it is the Olin Foundation that provided the bulk of the funding.
The point here is not that conservative foundations are large, because by the standards of the big foundations they are not. For example, Ford's assets in 2002 were $9,300 million, compared with Bradley's $485 million, and only three conservative foundations are in the top one hundred. Rather, it is that they have adopted a particular strategy, designed to influence ideas, in which they have been very successful. Funding to liberal causes has been as large, if not larger, but it has been less narrowly focused on achieving specific goals. 37
Technique and Ideology
A final approach to the story is the spread of mathematical techniques within economics. 38 Here, the story concerns only the shift of opinion within mainstream economics, for many free market economists have rejected the methods that have come to dominate economics within the past fifty years. It is a story that is sketched only briefly, to illustrate a further possible dimension to the problem. It is a methodological argument that, to be persuasive, needs to be developed in considerably more detail than the confines of a single essay permit. Whatever view is held about the causes, there is little dispute that economics has become more technical in the period since the Second World War (see, e.g., Solow 1997). In the 1940s it was becoming hard for many of the older generation to keep up with recent developments, and, despite the increase in mathematical training required of economists, this has remained true. There were some 36. See also Covington 1997, 8-10. 37 . A helpful discussion of this is provided in Schambra et al. 2004 , which is a discussion of Krehely, House, and Kernan (2004) fields where technical requirements had been high throughout the 1950s (for example, general equilibrium and social choice theory), but in the 1970s many fields that had previously been open to less technical work followed suit. Industrial economics, development economics, and even international trade and macroeconomics began to require understanding of mathematical techniques not required a decade earlier.
The conventional view is that the use of mathematics protects economists from ideology, 39 as well as from being accused of being driven by ideology. 40 However, there is another case that can be made. This is that the intellectual value judgments that underlie technical economics, as it currently exists, bias one toward conservative conclusions. Stigler (1959, 522) has argued that "the professional study of economics makes one politically conservative." He defined a conservative as someone who wishes most economic activity to be organized by private enterprise and believes that the forces of competition will generally hold private power in check and promote efficiency-an advocate of laissez-faire. In learning economics, one is drilled in the problems of all economic systems and how the price system solves these problems. Clearly, Stigler is not suggesting that any bias is involved here, but one might read it differently. For example, feminists have argued that male values underlie some of the basic value judgments underlying economic theory (see, e.g., Nelson 1993 Nelson , 2001 . 41 The reason the use of mathematics can introduce bias is that economics, like any science, is based on a set of intellectual values, some of which are explicit but most of which are implicit. Without them it could not function. Some of these are very basic-not deliberately falsifying one's results, acknowledging one's sources, and so on. Above this are values of the type that Daniel Hausman (1992) has sought to identify, such as the desire for theories that are of broad scope and the desire for economics to stand "separate" from other sciences, such as psychology. However, the most important aspect of this is the desire for a particular form of rigor. 42 Economists prefer theories where all the assumptions necessary to derive the conclusions are specified.
39. See Hutchison 1964. 40 . It has been argued that the reason why Samuelson's textbook could survive conservative criticism when Lorie Tarshis's book, which provided a similar exposition of Keynesian economics, could not, was that it was more technical.
41. The argument sketched below has much in common with some feminist arguments, such as Nelson's, but is taken in a different direction.
42. For a discussion of other types of rigor, see Weintraub 1998. If economists were omniscient and their theories were able to take into account every possible type of interaction between people, the requirement that theories be rigorous in this sense might be irrelevant. Regrettably, this is not the case. Economists have at their disposal a limited range of theoretical and conceptual tools that can be used in their mathematical modeling. The result is that the desire to derive arguments rigorously means that they are confining themselves to saying what these theoretical tools allow them to say. Given the state of the techniques available to economists, pursuing this form of rigor has severely constrained what economists have been able to say-the models and theories they have been able to work with. Individual optimization and perfect competition have been, for the most part, adopted not because economists believe them to be correct but because they permit rigorous analysis. This is changing as economists create new techniques, but slowly. The result can be to introduce bias, in much the same way that Julie A. Nelson (1993) has argued that even the notion of "scientific detachment" has gendered content.
One innovation introduced with the new classical macroeconomics (NCM) in the 1970s was methodological. Edmund Phelps and others had shown that limited information could be used to explain unemployment in a way that was consistent with rational, profit-maximizing behavior. The NCM elevated this into a methodological principle: that tastes and technology were fundamental, and that behavior should be modeled as if agents took advantage of all the opportunities open to them. When combined with the assumption that private agents were infinitely farsighted (any other assumption would be arbitrary and arguably irrational) and could anticipate all systematic (and hence predictable) government policy measures, it became hard to avoid the conclusion that active macroeconomic intervention would be ineffective. When combined with public choice arguments about the public sector decision making, activist government policy was almost inevitably seen in an even worse light. The use of representative-agent models, for purely pragmatic reasons (simplifying models so that they could be handled rigorously) ensured that coordination failures could not occur, for the same preferences underlay all private-sector decisions in the economy.
The point here is not that the use of mathematics dictated these conclusions. It clearly did not, as the example of new Keynesian macroeconomics makes clear. The point is that, at least for a while, a set of intellectual value judgments that could be presented as if they were entirely independent of any ideology made it easy to derive certain types of result and difficult to derive others. Whether or not Robert Lucas and the other architects of the new classical macroeconomics had any ideological ax to grind (I am not making any claim on this), the seemingly value-free nature of the intellectual value judgments involved, and the claim that this was the rigorous way to do macroeconomics, probably persuaded many economists to adopt a more critical attitude toward government than they would otherwise have done.
Is this not simply scientific progress, or what in section 1 was called "learning from experience"? In deciding that the Keynesian models used in the 1960s had to be changed, economists were certainly learning from experience. Insofar as there was evidence for these assumptions, the case that NCM involved learning from experience can be made, as argued in section 1. However, it is possible to argue that there was much more to it than that: that, as well as being influenced by evidence and conscious reasoning, economists were swayed by intellectual value judgments that were made simply because economists thought, no doubt for various reasons, that this must be a better way to do economics. Just as Nelson (1993) argues that a commitment to scientific detachment can produce gendered ideas, this is an argument that the intellectual values that mainstream macro economists adopted in the 1970s biased them away from solutions involving government intervention in the economy.
Conclusion
The rise of free market economics is a story with many dimensions. The account given here does little more than scratch the surface and sketch an agenda for a larger project. The essay suggests that the change in economists' attitudes toward the role of the state is a very complicated problem: it involves the internal dynamics of the economics profession and outside pressures ranging from changes in the funding regime to changes in the political environment. My conjecture is that no simple story will ever be adequate to explain it. One reason is that it relates to something that is hard to define precisely-the climate of opinion within the economics profession. This is what distinguishes the concern of this essay from others: for example, John Kelley's (1997) concern with free market politics in the United States, or Richard Cockett's (1994) concern with the organizations through which free market ideas were channeled into U.K. government policy, or political scientists' concerns with the implications of think tanks for the democratic process (McGann and Weaver 2002) . The rise of market economics is a broad phenomenon, encompassing both free market economics and a much broader movement among mainstream economists toward greater support for markets and away from confidence in direct government intervention and planning; spanning economic advice to governments and academic economics, microeconomics and macroeconomics, and much else. The overlaps are so great that much is lost when different parts of the phenomenon are analyzed separately.
One way to interpret these developments is to outline the variety of histories that can be written. 43 1. Learning from mistakes. This is the internalist account, or "Whig" history. It is the one that the majority of practicing economists, almost by definition, must subscribe to, for their own views are the latest available, and they would not hold them if they did not consider them superior to what had gone before. 44 On its own terms, such histories can provide convincing accounts of why economics changed in the 1970s toward a more free market economics. The point about the accounts given in section 1 is not that they stand up to detailed scrutiny but that they illustrate the types of account that most practicing economists would offer. 2. Changes in the demand for economic ideas. This involves looking more broadly than has been possible here at the patrons of economics (cf. Goodwin 1998). As the "effective demand" for economic ideas (demand backed up with cash) has changed, so has supply responded. In this story wealthy individuals, corporations, and those in control of foundations hold the key to what has happened. It has even been suggested that the key lies in the distribution of income-as the top 1 percent of the population has become 43. This list is not exhaustive. One theme that could be taken up is the political links of economists and the relationship between their political involvement and their economics. For example, little has been said here about libertarianism or anarchism as a political movement in which some of the economists discussed here were involved (see, e.g., Tucille 1971; Gerson 1997) . Another line of inquiry would be to explore the generational shifts more systematically by analyzing the periods when economists entered and left the profession-for example, when those with memories of the Depression retired-and the effects of this on the age profile of the discipline.
44. Frequently outsiders see ideology where insiders see good economics. Thus Jacob Viner, when he returned to a conference in Chicago in 1951, having left the faculty five years before, commented on how it was ideologically loaded (Reder 1982, 7 n. 19 ). To insiders, it was no doubt "good" economics.
vastly richer compared with middle-and low-income earners, politics have become more polarized and funding for organizations that pursue policies favored by the rich increases (cf. Krugman 2003, 220-21) . 3. Academic entrepreneurship. This story focuses on those who created the new institutions (of which those discussed here are the tip of the iceberg). The environment within universities and the financial context in which economists operate have changed dramatically in the past twenty years. 45 The creation of research centers has become almost a condition for doing research, and the ones discussed here illustrate centers that have been successful. Bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank, and central banks can be written into such a history as a new institutional forum where academic research and policymaking go together. Free market think tanks represent a similar form of entrepreneurship outside universities. Though they have generally aimed not at conducting basic research but at influencing policymakers, they have two other effects. They help change the climate of opinion and hence the range of ideas considered acceptable to entertain. In addition, they have provided new channels through which economic ideas can flow (or be directed); the existence of such channels may well influence supply. 46 4. Ideology. This covers at least three different histories. One is Amadae's story of the Cold War ideology that operated through RAND and associated organizations in the 1950s, whose effects may persist up to the present day. Though it was not about free market economics, as the term has come to be understood, rational choice theory can be seen as having laid the foundations for the subsequent ideological shift. A second is to focus from the start on the attempt to revive free market economics, in opposition to the technocratic approach of RAND and the economic mainstream of the 1950s and 1960s. This history starts with the Mont Pelerin Society, or perhaps with early Austrian economics. A third is a history in which ideology is not something that comes into economics from 46. This is not to imply any disingenuousness on the part of suppliers. It may be that if new publication opportunities arise, and if such publications influence promotion decisions, those whose work fits with what is demanded will be more likely to obtain promotion than those who do not. Economists whose work fits will be selected over those whose work does not. outside, in whatever guise, but is something that arises from within economics-from the basic intellectual value judgments on which the subject rests. 5. Important individuals. In Amadae's history, Arrow plays the key role in establishing rational choice liberalism, and by implication the case for free markets, as much through helping establish a set of intellectual values as for establishing a specific approach to economics. Against this, one might wish to argue that it was Friedman who set the tone of so many of the changes that took place in the 1970s, after which Chicago came to seem the center of economics rather than one of its peripheries. However, the institutional story emphasizes the importance of Hayek, a figure who is completely neglected in economists' internalist histories, as someone who effectively dropped out of serious economics in the 1940s. Hayek, though not a part of the Chicago school of economics, was connected to it; he was the inspiration for much Austrian economics; and he was behind the creation of many of the free market think tanks that began to transform the policy arena from the 1970s onward. 6. The internal dynamics of the economics profession. It is arguably not an accident that dissenters began to feel the constraints of orthodoxy in the 1970s. For much of the twentieth century there had been discussions about the role of the economics profession in society, and this had come to fruition (whether for good or ill) in the 1960s. 47 Accompanying this was the attempt to forge a consensus in which economists were technicians with access to a specialized body of knowledge that could be applied. This served to render life more difficult for dissenters, quite apart from the political turmoil of the Vietnam era and quite apart from the ideological implications discussed above. The timing may owe something to the cycle of generations: the 1970s was when the generation that came into the profession in the 1940s had reached the top.
The aim here is not to argue for one rather than another of these histories. They can all be made coherent and are legitimate ways of viewing how economists' attitudes toward government have changed. Taken individually, however, none is adequate. For example, economists were 47. See Kelley 1997 and Coats 2001 . For a longer perspective, see also Bernstein 2001 and, on Britain, Middleton 1998 clearly reacting to what they had learned, and they had to respond to what happened in the 1970s and after. However, evidence needs to be interpreted, and different interpretations, and hence paths for the subject, are conceivable. This account clearly begs the question of whether other paths might have been taken, and of the criteria that caused economists to consider modern theory an improvement on what went before, and whether external factors might not be important in explaining some of the choices made. Similarly, the Cold War may offer a plausible account of the origin of rational choice liberalism. But welfare economics did not die with the advent of social choice theory; there was great continuity between economics before and after the 1950s. Though it could be argued that the foundations of the subject had been severely damaged, the Arrow-Debreu theorems and the emergence of "Pareto efficiency" as a standard item in the economic theorist's tool kit gave welfare economics a new lease on life. It was altered profoundly by Arrow's theorem, but welfare economics was much more broadly based than just rational choice theory, even though the rhetoric of rational choice may have been used as a useful label for a very broad range of theorizing. When we turn to histories that focus on funding and entrepreneurship, there are questions about why the ventures discussed here, which (as some conservatives are quick to point out) are on a small scale compared with government funding of research through higher education and other institutions, could have done more than facilitate changes that were somehow implicit in the situation economists were facing (which turns attention back to the first history). There are also very severe problems of cause and effect. As for the intellectual bias caused by value judgments, this is clearly only a part of the story: explicit political biases seem likely to be important as well.
One response to the inability of any of these stories to encompass the whole history is to argue that they are layered: that some lie beneath others. The lessons from experience may, for example, provide the opportunities that are taken up by academic entrepreneurs who, through their identification of opportunities, are able to attract funding. What this amounts to is saying that there are causal links running from one story to another: in this case from the lessons of successes and failures of economics to the institutions and funding. However, to suggest that some of these stories lie beneath others is to suggest that causal links lie in but one direction. There are good reasons to believe that this is not so. Take the previous example: the lessons that economists choose to draw from their experiences will depend on the presuppositions of those with the most voice, and this may depend on funding, support within academia, and other factors. Causal links are likely to run in many directions, perhaps not surprisingly as these histories are themselves constructions placed on events.
The change in economists' attitudes toward the state discussed here yields several paradoxes. Friedman was central to the rise of the Chicago economics department and the development of a more critical attitude toward government within the mainstream; yet his methodology is unorthodox, having more in common with that of Wesley Clair Mitchell than with the mathematical economics and econometrics that has become dominant. It is paradoxical that Hayek's star has risen at precisely the time when a style of economics that, even more than Friedman, he rejected has come to the fore. The propagation of rational choice theory, which has lain behind much of the move toward free markets, by organizations and individuals committed to strong and efficient government is another. These reinforce the conclusion that we need a history sufficiently thick to encompass most, if not all, the stories that have been told here.
